S130 History

Experimentation with S-1 and the initial batch of five additional boats led to immediate improvements and innovations. For example, beginning with S-7 (1933), the increased reserve buoyancy of a knuckle added at the bow prevented the boat from nosing into waves in foul weather.

Another key innovation was the addition of a special rudder arrangement beginning with S-2 (1932). Port and starboard of the main rudder were two smaller “rudders” that could be angled outboard to 30 degrees. By generating what became known as the “Lürssen Effekt,” at high speed, the angled “rudders” drew a ventilation air pocket slightly behind the three screws, increasing their efficiency, reducing the stern wave and keeping the boat at a nearly horizontal attitude.

A wedge was added to the lower stern beginning with S-18 (1938). This deflected the water flow slightly downwards, counteracting any tendency for the hull to settle into the water as speed increased. Improvements were also made to the superstructure. On early boats, the commander stood outside on the deck behind a spray shield. Behind him in the wheelhouse stood the helmsman, navigator, radio operator and engine telegraphist. The commander communicated his orders through flexible voice tubes, or via a seaman equipped with a headset intercom.

The S-26 class (1940) instituted a 34.9m hull and several design changes. The torpedo tubes were enclosed in a decked-over forecastle, increasing interior space and reserve buoyancy. A cockpit was set into the wheelhouse roof, placing the commander in a central position with better visibility and shelter. Although they were wonderful sea-boats, they were notoriously “wet” and every scrap of shelter was welcome! From there, he could speak through portholes directly to the wheelhouse forward and navigator aft. His “instrument panel” consisted of glass windows through which he could observe a compass and the wheelhouse interior. (Note that there was no steering wheel in the cockpit.) Starting with S-30 (1939) several boats were built with a slightly smaller hull, 32.7m, and with the old style wheelhouse. The S-38 class, of which S-130 is an example, was a continuation of the S-26 class.

Experimentation with S-67 (1942) led to a design for a partially armour-plated cupola, the so-called Kalotte (skull cap), over the bridge. This added armour was a countermeasure to the growing firepower of British escort craft encountered in the English Channel. The S-Boote armament included a variety of combinations of cannon, from 20 – 37mm calibre, as well as the two 533mm torpedo tubes. Overall, there were many minor wartime changes to the armament, superstructure, and hull dimensions, but the hull design remained basically unchanged from S-18 onwards.

So there is no doubt that they were an outstanding design. In late July and early August 1945, future president John F. Kennedy visited defeated Germany with US Navy Secretary James Forrestal. As a former PT Boat commander, he was naturally interested in their German counterpart so he made a point of carefully inspecting an intact S-Boot at Bremen. Kennedy’s diary records his conclusion: the Schnellboot was “far superior”. Indeed, whilst a number of allied designs could just about keep up with or even (just) overhaul an S-Boot in calm water, nothing as fast was as heavily-armed and absolutely nothing could touch them in the typical conditions of the North Sea and Channel until the large (150 ft) British Fairmile “D” emerged, later in the War, as a reasonable adversary.

S130 – The Sole Survivor

The only known, surviving and seaworthy S-boot, S-130, was built at the Johann Schlichting boatyard as hull 1030 in Travemünde, on the Baltic Coast, and commissioned on October 21st 1943. Her Commanding Officer was Oberleutnant zur See Gunter Rabe and she was assigned to the 9th S-Boot Flotilla (commanded by Korvettenkapitän Götz Freiherr von Mirbach, one of the most famous S-Boot commanders of the war) to reinforce their presence in the Southern North Sea. They operated out of Rotterdam until mid-February 1944, when they re-deployed to Cherbourg in order to reinforce the 5th Flotilla (under Korvettenkapitän Bernd Klug) in their operations throughout the Central and Western Channel area. Throughout her service, her radio callsign was “Rabe” (Raven), her dashing Master was known by all in the 5th and 9th Flotillas as “The Raven” and she wore a ship’s crest incorporating a raven in addition to the usual 9th Flotilla sign. The two Flotillas in Cherbourg were directed from his HQ on the French mainland by Kapitän zur See Petersen (later to become Commander of the whole German Schnellbootwaffe).

Attack on Exercise Tiger

Following a succession of dashing and violent night engagements during March and April 1944, S-130 took part in one of the most daring and successful S-Boot operations of the War. Both Flotillas had conducted a number of attacks against Allied shipping off the southern coast of England including, on April 22, a successful attack on British Motor Gun Boats in Lyme Bay and, on the 24th, a very successful attack on shipping in the same area. Then, on the afternoon of 27 April, a Luftwaffe reconnaissance aircraft reported a convoy of 7 merchant ships off Start Point, England.

That morning, convoy T45 had left Plymouth for Lyme Bay as a preliminary to Operation Tiger, a US exercise intended to be a rehearsal for the forthcoming D-Day landings on Utah Beach. The exercise was to be conducted on Slapton Sands, near Dartmouth. As part of the exercise programme, the convoy’s primary purpose was to carry US tanks and men for Red Beach. It was led by the escort corvette HMS Azalea, followed by LST 515 and, at 700-yard intervals, LSTs 496, 511, 531 and 58 (towing two pontoon causeways).

The WW1 Destroyer HMS Scimitar should have been on station as the main escort but had been holed above the waterline in a minor collision the day before and had been kept in Plymouth for repairs. The Naval HQ in Plymouth had not been informed of this and, as a consequence, no replacement vessel was provided. This breakdown in communication did not become clear until the early evening when the Captain of Scimitar realised what had happened and alerted the staff at Flag Officer Plymouth, whereupon HMS Saladin was immediately detailed as relief escort. Unfortunately, she did not get under way for Start Bay until well after midnight. Nevertheless, interference from S-Boote had been anticipated. Units were positioned between Start Point and Portland Bill to screen the operation in Lyme Bay and three MTBs were positioned off Cherbourg.

Having been alerted by the earlier Lufwaffe report, however, all this activity had also attracted the attention of German shore-based surveillance systems and, as soon as it was completely dark (at about 2100 hours GMT) the 5th and 9th Schnellboot Flotillas, comprising six and three boats respectively, slipped out of Cherbourg. They evaded the small covering force of MTBs without difficulty and then, steaming at 36 knots under radio silence, soon covered the 90-odd nautical miles to the Northwest to break through the outer defensive screen across Lyme Bay.

Meanwhile, the slow-moving convoy had been joined by a column from Brixham comprising LSTs 499, 289 and 507 (508 had failed to make the rendezvous). By this time, the convoy was west of Tor Bay and steering NNW before executing a complicated manoeuvre for the final approach to Slapton Sands.

From his HQ on the French mainland, Kapitan zur See Petersen radioed the bearing of a possible target at 2317 hours and the E-boats of the 5th Flotilla split up into pairs to stalk their prey. Positive identification of targets was difficult, if not impossible and they moved slowly and quietly at first in order to retain surprise. After some time, at about 1.30 am, S-136 and S-138 spotted two “destroyers” at a range of 2000 metres and closed at speed. S-138 fired a double torpedo salvo at the stern of the right-hand ship and S-136 fired single torpedoes at the other. After a short interval, S-138 saw an explosion and, one minute later, S-136 noted simultaneous explosions on the second target.

S-140 and S-142 had also identified targets at about the same time and opened fire with double shots at 1400 metres but, when no explosions were heard, Oberleutnant zur See Götschke correctly concluded that the ships were shallow-draft landing craft. Meanwhile, S-100 and S-143, alerted to the action by red tracer to their north, closed at high speed and noted that a “tanker” was already well ablaze. Both boats fired two torpedoes at a target of around 1500 tons, achieving a solid hit with one of them.

The 9th Flotilla, comprising S-130, S-145 and S-150, were now attracted by red tracer from the 5th Flotilla (although at the time they thought they were from allied ships, since they understood that yellow tracer was to be used by their own force). Closing at speed, S-150 and S-130 turned straight in to a joint torpedo attack against a single ship while S-145 broke off to attack “small armed escorts” nearby (most likely more, lowered landing craft).

• 0133 Gunfire directed at convoy. Probably AA to draw return fire.
• 0133.5 General quarters sounded. No target visible. Order to open fire withheld to protect position of convoy.
• 0202 Convoy changed direction to 203 degrees. Explosion heard astern and LST 507, the last landing craft in the convoy, seen to be on fire
• 0215 LST 531 opened fire but no target visible from LST 58
• 0217 LST 531 hit and exploded.
• 0218 Decision to break formation and to proceed independently.
• 0224 Order given on LST 531 to abandon ship.
• 0225 E-boat sighted at 1500 metres. Four 40mm guns and six 20mm guns on LST 58 fired off 68 and 323 rounds respectively. The E-boat turned away and at “cease fire” was about 2000 metres distant when it disappeared from view.
• 0230 LST 289 was hit.
• 0231 LST 289 opened fire but target not seen from LST 58.
• 0237 Surface torpedo reported off bow of LST 58.
• 0238 to 0400 Bright magnesium flares sighted in all directions with the intention of discouraging the scattered convoy making for shore. E-boat engine noises heard on too many occasions.
• 0432 Order given on LST 507 to abandon ship.
• 0442 LST 515 lowered boats and picked up survivors from LST 507.

In the confusion of the action and darkness, it was impossible to be certain what was happening. The British Fighter Direction Tender, FDT 217, had sailed out of Portland to provide radar and communications cover (she was one of three FDTs that would provide stalwart service off Normandy two months later) but, on this particular night, she received a signal: “Make port all haste” which she duly did. Elsewhere the scale of the debacle was becoming only too apparent.

LSTs 507 and 531 had been sunk with the loss of 202 and 424 lives respectively – a total of 626 out of a total US Army and US Navy complement of 943. LST 289 was damaged with the loss of 13 men and LST 511 was hit by fire from LST 496 resulting in 18 wounded. In the end, the total of 639 American killed and missing was 4 times the actual losses on Utah beach on D-Day, for which this exercise had been intended as a rehearsal.

A Twist in the Fortunes of War

On 12 May 1944, S-130 bore witness to one of the War’s many, tragic, little footnotes. S-130 was taking part in a patrol of some 10 S-Boote to the south of the Isle of Wight. The Royal Navy soon discovered them and destroyers were dispatched in pursuit. During the ensuing engagement, The Free French ship La Combattante succeeded in sinking S-141, onboard which was Oberleutnant zur See Klaus Dönitz, the son of Grossadmiral Dönitz, Chief of the German Naval Staff. He was training to qualify for command of an S-Boot and was among the 18 crew from S-141 who died.

D-Day – The Turn of the Tide and the Long Retreat

On the morning of 6 June 1944, D-Day, S-130 was one of the 31 battle-ready S-Boote sent to attack the Allied fleet. Several successes were claimed but, against such an assault force (4126 landing vessels and transports, 1213 warships and total air supremacy over the landing area and approaches), the Kriegsmarine could do little to hinder the massed landings. The 9th Flotilla sank a number of landing craft but records do not indicate whether any were attributed to S-130. Since two of her ship’s company were killed, however, it may reasonably be deduced that she was in the thick of the action. Thereafter, it was a question of retreating east along the Channel and North Sea coasts as the Allied armies advanced towards the Rhine and Germany, trying always to harry and disrupt their sea lines of communication. Little specific record remains of the many engagements that were played out in the darkness of the winter of 1944/45 although it is clear the 9th Flotilla and S-130 were seldom away from the action. By the spring of 1945, German Naval operations in the southern North Sea had all but been suspended and the cessation of hostilities in May found S-130 in Rotterdam. She had survived to fight again.

Old Wine in new bottles…

In May 1945, S-130 and S-208 were taken as British war prizes. A team of German delivery crews from the German Minesweeping Administration (GM/SA) subsequently brought them to Gosport, England, together with a variety of other small craft.

During the ensuing period, the Royal Navy used them for test and trial purposes as Experimental Craft FPB 5130 and FPB 5208. As they were to be used unarmed, the torpedo tubes were de-activated and closed, and the cannon unshipped. Additional fuel tanks were installed in order to increase their operating radius and powerful radar and radio direction finding suites were fitted. In order to conduct comparative trials, S-130 had her three MB 501 V-20 diesels replaced by three, state-of-the-art Napier-Deltic diesels rated at 3140-PS each, whilst S-208 retained her original engines. This new lease of life gave S-130 a speed of 45 kts – an increase of about 5 knots on her previous maximum.

It was then decided to re-deploy them to British-occupied Germany on reconnaissance duties under the direction of Flag Officer Germany and, for this new role, the boats were given a coat of special, white, non-reflecting paint.

Pirates Turned Spies ……….

At first, they were used for coastal survey, based in Rotterdam, but the British Admiralty had urgent need of information about the equipment and activities of the Soviet Fleet, who were making their presence in the Baltic increasingly felt. The boats were re-deployed to Kiel (under command of one Lt Cdr John Harvey-Jones) and were soon turning up in the middle of Soviet Fleet manoeuvres and in the approaches to their bases. They photographed Soviet Units, collected a large quantity of useful information and made a thorough nuisance of themselves but, as soon as they were detected they were able to escape at high speed despite all efforts to intercept them. In order to confuse the situation further, they carried and wore a variety of ensigns and insignia. This made identification very difficult, as several navies used former Kriegsmarine S-Boote, given to them by the US and UK as war prizes, at this time.

During this period (1948/9), a decision was made to set up a “British Baltic Fishery Protection Service (BBFPS)” as a cover organisation. Its principal purpose was to conceal the details of Operation Jungle, a programme for the clandestine insertion of agents into the Baltic States, to be mounted by the British Secret Intelligence Service (MI6). They had trained selected emigrants from Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia as agents and these were by now ready to be returned in order to link up with anti-Soviet resistance groups who had been conducting anti-Soviet resistance and hiding in the forests since the end of the war.

The Royal Navy felt confident that it could find suitable German candidates to crew a small flotilla for this dangerous undertaking. Tens of thousands of Kriegsmarine personnel had worked for the Royal Navy as part of the British-supervised German Mine Sweeping Administration and its smaller civilian successor, the Cuxhaven Mine Sweeping Group. Most importantly, these included one Hans–Helmut Klose, a daring veteran of the Kriegsmarine S–Bootwaffe. During the last year of World War II, Klose had commanded the 2nd Fast Torpedo Boat Training Flotilla, which operated throughout the Baltic during the final desperate months of the Kriegsmarine’s existence. Klose’s boats performed a wide range of missions, including the escort of transports, reconnaissance missions, clandestine insertion of agents and even the rescue of high-ranking officials from encircled enclaves. He had fought the Soviet Fleet off Kürland and, during the last days of the War, had played a leading role in the brilliantly-executed but desperate evacuation of Libau in East Prussia. He was highly-regarded and had no “baggage” from the British point of view: Klose was a born pirate but he was no Nazi.

In May 1948, Commander Anthony Courtney RN, an intelligence officer, interviewed Klose and asked him whether he would be interested in putting his unique experiences and talents to use against the Russians. He agreed and soon got things moving. Operations began in May 1949, from when MI6 used S-208 (alias FPB 5208) and a variety of other vessels to transport agents to landing sites in Polanga (Lithuania), Uzava and Ventspils (Latvia) Saaremaa (Estonia), and Stolpmünde (Poland). The boats flew the White Ensign but were manned by German crews, all former members of the Kriegsmarine S-Bootwaffe. Called to duty again, this time in the service of the British, they formed what was to become famous – albeit in rarefied, clandestine circles – as “The Klose Fast Patrol Group”.

The agents were flown from England to West Germany, landing there on British military airfields from where they were brought to various harbours to board one of Klose’s vessels. The first stage of the trip was usually to Bornholm, off the Swedish coast, where they would await the radio signal from London giving the final order to penetrate the territorial waters of the USSR. On receipt, British Officers would issue any final instructions and disembark, leaving the German crew to make the run. Only the vessel’s Commander knew the destination. After nightfall, the boat closed slowly and quietly to within about 3nm of the coast. Following the satisfactory exchange of agreed authentication signals with the shore reception party, a rubber dinghy with an outboard motor was lowered and the coxswain, who was in radio communication with the mother S-Boot, put the agents ashore. There he embarked any agents for return to England and rejoined the S-Boot which, after clearing the coast with the minimum of noise and disturbance, accelerated out of hostile territorial waters.

S-130 Joins a Very Private Club

After these rather improvised beginnings, MI6 decided to create a more permanent organisation, which was set up 1951 in Hamburg-Finkenwerder and later moved back again to Kiel. In 1952, S-130, rejoined her sister ship S-208 and the scope of operations was widened to include electronic and signal intelligence activities. This involved the fitting of a variety of signal intelligence (SIGINT) equipment and, from 1953 on, following a co-operation agreement between the British and the American Secret Services, American CIA agents (supported by the famous US-backed Gehlen organisation) were also inserted along the coasts of the Baltic States by Klose’s boats.

In 1952, following the arrival of S-130, the Group had been further reinforced. The German Federal Border Guard (Sea) (Bundesgrenzschutz See) had ordered three fast patrol boats of the modernised Kriegsmarine S-Boot type from the Lürsen shipyard but their designed speed of 43 kts broke the terms of the Potsdam agreement under which construction of such fast patrol boats was prohibited. The British waited until they were completed and paid for, confiscated the boats just before they were due to be delivered – an example of the perfidy of Albion that can have few equals – and then commissioned two of them as Storm Gull and Silver Gull with the usual German crews. Finally, in 1954/55, three more, newly-built Schnellboote arrived to relieve S-130 and S-208, both of whom were by now looking decidedly war-weary.

Seaworthy Ships but a Leaking Intelligence Service.

From 1951 onwards, MI6 had suspected that Soviet counter-intelligence might have infiltrated the spy networks in the forests of Kürland. In fact, the KGB had been very successful with its counter-penetration operation “Lursen-S.” Over 40 agents were inserted into the field and all were caught, sentenced, or turned as moles or double agents. This complete failure of the MI6 operation in the Kürland had much to do with superciliousness and a lamentable lack of internal security inside MI6 itself. In the end, neither MI6 nor the KGB achieved their intended aims and many human lives were sacrificed for a trickle of information which, after close analysis, proved to be of little value. The landings were finally stopped for good in 1955.

In contrast, the Naval intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance operations conducted by the Klose Fast Patrol Group were very successful indeed and it was for this that Lt Cdr Harvey Jones (now rather better-known as Sir John Harvey-Jones, formerly Chairman of ICI) was made an MBE. These operations also did much to set aside the Anglo-German naval bitterness and resentment of the immediate post-war period and laid the foundation of what was to become the German Navy’s new “Schnellbootflotille” and the Intelligence Organisation.

The New Germany Joins NATO and The Bundesmarine is Born

In spring 1956 the BBFPS was disbanded. The crews received medallions from a grateful Royal Navy for their services and the boats were handed over to the nascent German Federal Navy. Our heroines, S-130 and S 208, were restored to their old condition and handed over, in March 1957. They were used as high-speed training vessels, designated UW 10 and UW 11 respectively, at the underwater warfare school, while the newer boats formed the first Fast Torpedo Boat Squadron.

Most of the crew members also joined the German Federal Navy and the Flotilla Commander, Hans Helmut Klose, finally retired in the rank of Vice Admiral, having created and commanded the complete, new and excellent Schnellboot arm, in 1978. S-208 was finally broken up but S-130 continued to give valuable service as a test and training platform in a variety of roles under the pennant number EF3. She was finally paid off for the last time, after 48 years’ service, in 1991 in Wilhelmshaven, where she remained as a house-boat.

A new chapter begins…

In Jan 2003 S130 was purchased privately, for restoration in the UK. On arrival in the uk from Germany, she was taken to the British Military Powerboat Trust at the Husbands Shipyard in Marchwood, Southampton.The restoration process started there, but ceased when financial problems intervened. BMPT purchased the boat, and prevented her decline, until a new home could be found for her.After many years of negotiation, she was taken to the slipway at Hythe, where, under the direction of BMPT member Richard Hellyer, she was prepared for a towage trip to Plymouth.Her new owners, arranged for her to be slipped at their yard in Plymouth.The plans for her restoration at this yard came to nothing, and S130 was finally sold to Kevin Wheatcroft, who is in the process of restoring S130 back to her former glory.